Abstract There has recently been considerable progress in the area of using computers as a tool for theorem proving. In this paper we focus on one facet of human-computer interaction in such systems: generating natural language explanations from proofs. We first discuss the x proof system-a tactic style theorem proving system for first-order logic with a collection of inference rules corresponding to human-oriented proof techniques. In x, proofs are stored as they are discovered using a structured term representation. We describe a method for producing natural language explanations of proofs via a simple mapping algorithm from proof structures to text.
Introduction
One common route in the formal verification of correctness is to axiomatize the system under study, and then verify its properties using proof theory. The desire to provide computer-aided facilities for the construction of these proofs has led to the development of several systems for interactive and semi-automatic construction of proofs in various logics. Examples include LCF[6] and Nuprl [2] . These systems typically provide a collection of inference rules that correspond to human-oriented proof techniques such as indirect proof and case analysis. This allows construction of natural proofs, encourages user involvement in the search for proofs, and facilitates understanding of the resulting proofs. The x proof system [3] , built by the first author, is a theorem proving system built on these principles. x includes several additional facilities, including a mechanism for producing explanations from proofs.
The explanation of a proof can take numerous equivalent forms depending on taste, background, and the type of information to be conveyed. A basic criterion for presenting a proof is the ability to disregard uninteresting detail and present only the most relevant facts. Furthermore, if a proof is specific to a given domain, the explanation should be presented in terms of concepts which have meaning within that domain. This is particularly true in theories where logical operations correspond to specialized inferences. For instance, in a first-order theory of inheritance, it makes sense to explain a proof in terms of inheritance rather than the basic logical operations. Along the same lines, explaining a proof of a statement in a nonclassical logic will require specialized treatment of any operators which are not found in first-order logic.
In this paper, we first present the generation of explanations of proofs in x, and then show how x can be extended to produce explanations for proofs in modal epistemic logic [l], a nonclassical logic originally developed by philosophers to describe certain language constructions involving knowledge and belief [IO] . Variations on standard epistemic logics have been employed in AI [I41 and in distributed systems [SI as well as other areas. We then demonstrate the explanation algorithm on a variant of the well-known wise men problem[l5]. We present two different levels of explanation, and discuss other possible extensions and variations.
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In the x proof system, proofs are stored using a structured term representation. Explanations are generated by mapping these proof terms to natural language text. This mapping algorithm is simple, yet flexible in that it is possible to generate different kinds of explanations
Constructing Proofs and Generating Explanations
to meet the needs of different users. The form and content of a given explanation depends upon the information extracted from its corresponding proof term, and the manner in which that information is mapped to strings of text.
In this section, we first discuss the proof system used in x and present the term representation for proofs. We then briefly describe the proof construction component used to search for proofs. This component is quite important since it is at this stage that proof terms are built, and the information used later in generating explanations is recorded. By changing the proof at this level, we may change the explanation. Finally, we present the algorithm for mapping proof terms to natural language explanations.
Sequential
Trees In x, proofs in first-order logic are constructed using a Gentzen style sequent system similar to the LK system [5] . A sequent, consisting of a set, C, of hypotheses, and a set, A, of conclusions, is written C + A. Such a sequent has the interpretation, "from the formulas in C, we can prove one of the formulas in A." In x, Gentzen's LK inference rules are available as well as several additional derived rules, providing the user with more choices in constructing proofs. These rules are described in [3] . For example, the first inference rule below is the LK rule to introduce a disjunction on the left of the sequent arrow, corresponding to an argument by case analysis. The second rule is a derived rule for modus ponens. Proof C o n s t r u c t i o n i n x The x proof system employs tactics and tacticals as the mechanism for proof search and construction. In general, in tactic style theorem provers, primitive tactics implement inference rules, while tacticals provide a mechanism for building compound tactics by composing primitive tactics in various ways. Tactics and tacticals promote modular design in the construction of theorem provers, and provide flexibility in controlling both interactive and automatic aspects of the search for proofs (see [6,4]).
In x the primitive tactics implement the inference rules of our modified LK proof system. (For more information on the use of tactics and tacticals in x, see [12] .) The ability to introduce new tactics into the theorem proving environment provides a mechanism for incrementally enhancing the interactive proof environment with new inference rules. For example, derived rules such as the forwardchain rule above enhance user interaction during proof search by providing human-oriented proof techniques. As we will see, this capability also enhances the explanation facility. New inference rules introduce new proof structures, which will be mapped t o the appropriate natural language text.
The Explanation Algorithm The explanation algorithm is implemented by providing, for each inference rule, a corresponding function which takes the explanations of the proofs of the premises and puts them together, possibly adding more text, to construct the explanation for the proof of the conclusion. This algorithm will only "lexicalize" inference rules to produce a skeletal outline for proofs. We will not lexicalize formulas, though this could be done fairly easily and would often produce more readable text.
To illustrate how the mapping is achieved, consider the or-L inference rule above. A term of the form or-l(Tl,Tz) represents a proof using case analysis. If TI is mapped to text1 which is the text for the proof of the left premise arguing that A follows from A and C, and Tz is mapped t o textz which argues that A follows from B and C, then the text below is one possible mapping of or-l(Tl,Tz) to the conclusion that A follows from A V B and C.
We have two cases. Case 1: Assume A. teztl Case 2: Assume B. text2 Thus, in either case, we have A.
As another example, if tezt is the explanation for TZ representing a proof of B,C + A in the proof term foruardchain(Tl,Tz), the resulting explanation is simply:
By modus ponens we have B . tert
All inference rules can be given such interpretations. Using this mapping algorithm the following explanation is generated for the simple example above.
Assume Vw R ( w , w ) . Assume Vy(R(a,y) 3 P(y)). Let
By modus ponens we have P(a). Since a was arbitrary we
Even here, we have made choices in the presentation. An experienced logician would probably suppress the statements about the instantiation of variables since they can be inferred from context. This can be achieved by modifying the mapping to text of the all-L rule.
Modal Logic Proof Systems
The modal language we will consider is a slightly modified form of that found in [15] . We consider some set of rz agents and discuss what these agents "know" by introducing modal operators of the form K , (z = 1,. . . , n). We form the language by considering all sentences constructed from some set of propositions, the usual logical connectives, and the (monadic) modal operators. Thus we have statements of the form K , A and K , d < J ( A V B ) with the informal interpretations "agent i knows that A" and "agent i knows that it is not the case that agent j knows either A or B," respectively. The semantic interpretation for I<, developed initially in [lo] , is that to know something is t o see that it is true in all possible configurations of the world imaginable given what is currently known. Thus, the modal operator is not interpreted truth-functionally-the truth of K , A depends not just on the truth of A, but its truth in all states consistent with the current one. Different In our modal Gentzen system, we will ornament formulas with a world term denoting the situation in which the formula is to be
We will also extend term s ference rule is K,-R will be re , W ) . The argument for the proof of the A G e n t z e n Proof for t h e W this puzzle, a king has three advis is the wisest. He white dots, is also forced to admit ignorance. The final advisor, based On the admissions of his colleagues, is now able to conclude he has a white dot. For illustration purposes, we have shortened the puzzle to involve a queen with two advisors. The reasoning remains essentially the same.
In the following, interpret P, as the proposition, "advisor i has a white dot on her head." Zit is, of course, interpreted as, "advisor i knows that", and 0 is interpreted as, "it is common knowledge that.n The Proof system will include rules for the modal operators Kl, K2 and 0.
.These modalities all have a reflexive, transitive possible-world relation, and, in addition, the theory for 0 states that if, for any i, 2~ R, U', then 20 Ro U'. That is, the possible-world relation for 0 is the superset of all individual possible-world relations. The axioms for the advisor puzzle (adapted from [15]) are given below.
It is common knowledge that someone has a white dot: O(pl V p z ) .
However, we will use the logically equivalent form O(-pz 3 p l )
since it results in a better explanation. In ,y, we allow the user to choose either form by including a tactic for an inference rule which treats implication as the equivalent disjunction.
2.
It is common knowledge that the first advisor knows whether the second advisor has a white dot or not: O(Ii1pZ v Iil-pz).
Advisor 2 knows that her colleague has no information as to the color of her own dot: I i z 4 1 p l .
We have axiomatized the puzzle asymmetrically-in general, either advisor could determine the color of her spot if her colleague speaks first. However, since the dual axioms are never used, we have not included them here. We wish to demonstrate that Advisor 2 can determine she has a white dot: Kzpz. The proof tree in Figure 2 establishes the necessary conclusion. The term representation for this proof is: imp-r (and-1 (and-l(K2r(K2-1(0-1 (or-l(Kl-l(axiom(pz .z ,RI)),
axiom(p1 ,y.Pz)) ) ) ) 1)) ) ) 1) 1)
Explanations of Modal Proofs
To extend the explanation algorithm to mod& logic, we must add text generation functions whose contribution to the explanation will depend on the meaning of the corresponding modal operator. This contribution can vary depending on context and the amount of detail desired in the explanation. For example, the rules for the knowledge operators embody the fact that if K * A is true (in world w), then A is also true (in world x ) , as long as z is &-related to w. The ' simplest explanations, which we will demonstrate first, assume that the reader is familiar with these rules, so that if K , A is true, it will not be necessary to explicitly state A before using it. Such a reader will not need to know the details of how the possible worlds are related. This kind of detail would add unnecessary clutter to the proof. A Skeletal Explanation We explain an instance of the K,-R rule by simply concluding K,A after explaining the proof of A. This reflects the modal rule of necessitation. The function for K,-R takes an input argument text which is the explanation for the proof for R, w R, x ; C -+ A, A, (the premise of the rule) and produces the following text as the proof of the conclusion:
text. Thus K,A. The K,-L function is even simpler. In the conclusion of this rule, K;A is an assumption which takes the form A in the premise. Since these two are equivalent to our reader, the explanation for the premise and conclusion will be the same, i.e. the function Ki-L takes the input text and returns it unchanged. The explanation functions for the common knowledge operator will be defined in the same way as those for K i .
Returning to the wise queen example, the explanation generated using the above functions is: Assume:
O(-m 3 P I )

IiziKim
We have two cases: Case 1: Klpz Case 2: K 1 -p~. By modus ponens, we have pi. Thus Thus, in either case, we have p z . Hence, Zczpz.
K I P ] .
Hence, we have a contradiction.
I
A More Detailed Explanation For a reader not so familiar with the axioms and inference rules of modal logic, this explanation is probably too skeletal. Since modal logic is not truth-functional in the classical sense, the surface structure of a proof does not directly mirror the underlying model theory, though one is often interested in the actual model-theoretic underpinnings of a modal statement [ll] . As we have pointed out, a direct explanation of a first-order translation is too general, so we will develop an algorithm which gives a "deeper" explanation of the proof which is specialized to possible-world semantics. We will borrow terminology from Moore [14] and Hintikka [IO], and refer to possible worlds as "situations" or "states of affairs." A state of affairs can be thought of as the set of propositions which are true in that situation. The possible-world relation will be interpreted as linking consistent states of affairs. The new function for K,-R will return the text string:
Let situation x be an arbitrary state of affairs consistent with situati6n W. text. Since situation x is consistent with situation w, we have K,A in situation w .
Here, text is the explanation of the premise sequent, x is the possibleworld variable ornamenting the formula A in the premise, and w is the world ornamenting If,A in the conclusion. Since the proof terms fully represent sequential proof trees, alI the necessary information (including these world variables) will be present and obtainable from the input arguments to the explanation function.
The new K,-L function generates the following explanation:
We have A in situation x . text.
Once again the explanation functions for the common knowledge modal operator 0 will be similar to those for K$, except that the phrase "We have" will be replaced by "From common knowledge we have."
To obtain this kind of deeper explanation, in addition t o these new functions for the knowledge operators, the explanation functions for the remainder of the inference rules must give the information about the situation. This is accomplished by adding the text "in situation w" after every formula that is inserted into the text, where w is the ornamentation on the formula. Using these explanation functions, the text for our example is: Assume: The second explanation provides two kinds of additional information.
First, it provides more detail about the chain of inference. For example, in the first explanation Klpl contradicts the fact that Advisor 2 knows that i I1'1pl (given by the third assumption). In the second explanation, the additional inference to obtain -X l p l is stated explicitly, and the contradiction follows from the resulting formula. Second, information from the possible-world ornamentations is used t o give explicit reference as to how situations are related. For example, in Case 2, we conclude y p z 3 pl in situation y from O ( i p 2 2 p z ) in situation w. This follows from earlier statements that situation w is consistent with situation x , and situation z is consistent with situation y. While this is more detailed than the first explanation, it assumes some familiarity on the part of the reader about how worlds are related. For example, the reader must understand that the possible-world relation is transitive. A slightly more detailed explanation would result from explicitly stating the consistency conditions that prevailed in order t o apply K,-L. We can generate such an explanation by using the information in P (the proof of the proviso) when explaining instances of the K,-L rule. In this kind of explanation, the inferences used to determine that the situation of the premise is consistent with the situation of the conclusion would be explicitly stated.
Discussion
We have presented a technique for the generation of text explanations for proofs in modal logic. These explanations were generated from structures corresponding to Gentzen style proofs in a modified sequent system. Proofs in this system were represented via a recursive term structure, and explanations generated by a simple mapping from these term structures to text strings.
We have selected a particular style of Gentzen proofs for a single modal logic. Other proof systems and logics may lead t o different explanations. Also, we presented only two possible explanations. We can certainly obtain others by examining different kinds of mappings from proof terms to text. Yet another way to generate new explanations is to go back t o the proof construction component and construct different proofs (thus obtaining different proof terms) for the same formula. Such new proofs may use alternative inference rules which will have their own encoding as proof terms, and thus their own mapping function to natural language text. The design of the proof construction component and the kinds of inference rules available play an important role in the generation of explanations.
. Finally, we note that we have only presented a subset of the facilities available in x for manipulating proofs of modal statements. x also has facilities for integrating proofs automatically generated via traditional methods such its resolution for first-order logic. These proofs can be transformed into the sequential proof system used in the interactive environment. In order to do this, a technical device called expansion proofs [13] is employed. Expansion proofs can be extended t o modal logic [7] thus allowing the automatic generation of modal proofs. By transforming these proofs to sequential proofs, we can produce explanations for modal statements in a completely automated fashion.
